We study the problem of providing workflow data provenance without revealing the functionality of any module. We develop a model that formalizes the notion of privacy of modules embedded in a workflow structure as a natural extension of privacy of standalone modules. Our model shows that by hiding a small amount of carefully chosen data, one can ensure privacy of all modules over an unbounded number of executions. The problem of identifying the smallest possible amount of such data is NP-hard, and in the full generality of our model it is in fact even hard to get a good approximation. However, we are able to design good approximation algorithms for optimizing the amount of hidden data when either the privacy model is slighted restricted or there is bounded sharing of data items among various modules.
Introduction
Scientific workflow systems (e.g. myGrid/Taverna, Kepler, VisTrails, Pegasus (see [25, 7, 17] )) are extensively used for specifying and executing in-silico experiments or processes. Such a system can be thought of as a program, producing a set of final output data from a set of initial input data in an execution. Internally, a workflow system comprises a set of modules (i.e. programs) with input and output data ports. An output port of a module is connected to a set of input ports of other modules (called internal connections) and/or has an external connection if it produces final output data. On the other hand, an input port of a module either receives input data from the output port of another module on an internal connection or has an external connection on which it receives initial input data. In addition to initial input data and final output data, an execution of a workflow also produces intermediate data, i.e. data produced by a module at an output port that does not have an external connection. Intermediate data produced by a module is passed along internal connections to input ports of other modules. Parameters can also be specified for modules and, for uniformity, are considered to be initial inputs as well. In this paper, we assume that the connections form an acyclic graph on the modules, which is common in many of the aforementioned workflow systems [17, 25] .
Once specified, a workflow may be executed multiple times using different initial input data and generating much intermediate and final output data. To keep track of how the different output data were generated and ensure their reproducibility, many workflow systems are beginning to provide tools to capture and manage data provenance. Data provenance is defined as the set of dependencies between data (initial input, intermediate and final output) pertaining to an execution, including the module executions that produced them. 4 , while the other output data bit d 6 = 1 − d 4 is produced by f 3 . A source node s distributes initial input data to input ports (along e 1 and e 2 ), and a sink node t collects final output data from the output ports (along e 6 and e 7 ), corresponding to external connections. Note that the data bit d 4 produced by v 1 acts as input to both v 2 and v 3 ; in general, a data output by a module can act as input to multiple modules as well as (possibly) be a final output data. We call this phenomenon data sharing. Also, observe that a workflow may be a multigraph: in this example, v 1 sends two data bits d 3 Although provenance is important, if information about all intermediate data is repeatedly given for multiple executions of a workflow on different initial inputs, it may end up exposing partial or complete functionality of some of the modules. As an example, consider the module v 3 Clearly, provenance data for module v 3 for these two executions exposes the function f 3 . However, workflow modules may involve proprietary code or algorithms, requiring that their functionality be kept private. Therefore the workflow owner would like to limit the amount of provenance data that she gives the user for any execution of a workflow to ensure privacy of modules in terms of their functionality. But for the workflow to be practically meaningful, it is unrealistic to hide the initial input or the final output data. In this paper, we achieve privacy of modules in a workflow by hiding a carefully chosen subset of intermediate data.
In Figure 1 , suppose that the workflow owner hides bit d 4 . Now, even if the workflow is executed an arbitrary number of times, the user gets no information about function f 3 , and some partial information about functions f 1 and f 2 . To decide whether f 1 and f 2 remain private, we need to quantify the notion of privacy of modules in a workflow. We will give a formal definition later, but for now, we informally say that a module is ε-private for some parameter 0 < ε < 1 if given any input to the module, the user can guess the correct output with probability at most ε. It 3 , hiding only this bit gives the same privacy guarantee. Moreover, some data may be more important than others, or may be contain more information, necessitating the introduction of a cost function which assigns a cost to each data item in the workflow. The cost of an item indicates the utility lost to the user when a data is hidden. Assuming that all initial input and final output data should always be visible, the following question arises: what is the minimum cost of intermediate data that can be hidden while guaranteeing that individual modules are ε-private for some given parameter ε > 0? We call this the SECURE VIEW problem. In this paper, we define and offer algorithmic solutions to this problem.
The data model considered in this paper is general enough to capture most practical applications. We assume that each data d is a binary string that comes from a fixed (but unbounded, and possibly infinite) domain D ⊆ {0, 1} * . Therefore, a module with p input ports and q output ports takes as input p binary strings, computes a function on them and outputs q binary strings. For example, a module might read two input strings, interpret them as integers and output their sum and product. Then, the function computed by the module maps from the set ({0, 1} * ) 2 to itself.
We also assume that the user gets to see all connections between modules in the workflow, only the values of some data are hidden. Thus the data values on all connections carrying those data are hidden in all executions of the workflow.
Related Work. To the best of our knowledge, the only previous work that deals with security in a workflow is [9] . The paper develops a framework to output a partial view of the workflow that conforms to a given set of access permissions on the connections and input/output ports. However, their treatment of the notion of privacy is somewhat informal, and no guarantees on the quality of the solution are provided. Furthermore, in our problem, hiding internal connections may lead to disconnected input and output ports, potentially disconnecting the workflow network. Another relative weakness of the approach [9] is that it reveals less provenance information than our mechanism of only hiding data values, since the dependency of visible data on the modules is unknown to the user.
A related domain that has received considerable attention is that of privacy-preserving data mining (see surveys [1, 29] , and the references therein). Here, the goal is to hide individual data attributes while retaining the suitability of the data for mining patterns. For example, the technique of anonymizing data makes each record indistinguishable from a large enough set of other records in certain identifying attributes [28, 21, 3] . Privacy preserving approaches have been studied for social networks [19, 6, 26, 8] , auditing queries [24, 22] and in other contexts. Another widely used technique is that of data perturbation where some noise (usually random) is added to the the output of a query or to the underlying database. This technique is often used in statistical databases, where a query computes some aggregate function on the dataset [2, 10] . Privacy in statistical databases is often quantified using the framework of differential privacy, which requires that the output distribution is almost invariant to the inclusion of any particular record (see [14, 18, 13, 15] and surveys [11, 12] ). However, in the context of data provenance, the goal is to hide module functionality rather than particular data items, hence there does not seem to be an obvious extension of the notion of differential privacy to our context. Further, for provenance information to be useful, individual data items that are revealed must be accurate, especially for applications such as ensuring reproducibility of experiments. Thus, adding noise to provenance information renders it useless. It would be interesting to see if the notion of privacy of functions that we introduce in this paper lends itself to a new notion of differential privacy of functions.
Contributions.
Our first contribution is to formalize the notion of ε-privacy of a module when it is a standalone entity (called the standalone module privacy) as well as when it is a component of a workflow (called the in-network module privacy), interacting with other modules. While standalone module privacy can be naturally captured in terms of input and output data at the module interface that needs to be hidden, the notion of in-network privacy of a module is inherently linked to the network topology of the workflow and functionality of other modules. Even so, we are able to show that the problem of ensuring in-network privacy of a workflow of modules essentially reduces to implementing the standalone privacy requirements for each module. Building on this connection, we develop algorithms and complexity results for the SECURE VIEW problem, defined as the problem of ensuring in-network privacy of all modules in a workflow by hiding the smallest amount of data. The standalone privacy requirement of each module in a workflow can be specified in the most general form as a list of pairs of input-output data sets (called set constraints) that need to be hidden to ensure ε-privacy. Alternately, a more succinct but less expressive representation is to specify a list of pairs of numbers (called cardinality constraints) for each module such that hiding at least as many input and output data as specified in any pair guarantees standalone privacy for that module. Both variants of the SECURE VIEW problem are easily shown to be NP-hard, and thus we focus on poly-time approximation algorithms 1 for these problems.
Our second key contribution is a linear-programming (LP) based approach to obtain an O(log n)-approximation for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints. Moreover, we show that this is the best possible approximation guarantee achievable in poly-time, modulo standard complexity-theoretic assumptions. In contrast, we show that the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints is much harder to approximate: in particular, we show that for some ε > 0, it is ℓ ε max -hard to approximate under standard complexity assumptions, where ℓ max is the length of longest requirement list for any module. On the other hand, an ℓ max -approximation is easily achievable in poly-time, again using an LP-based approach. Finally, we show that both variants of the SECURE VIEW problem becomes more tractable when the workflow has bounded data sharing, i.e. when a data in the workflow acts as input to at most γ modules for some constant γ. We give a (γ + 1)-approximation algorithm for this situation, and show that the problem is APX-hard 2 to approximate even when there is no data sharing (i.e. γ = 1).
Organization. Section 2 defines the notions of standalone and in-network ε-privacy. We formalize the SECURE VIEW problem in Section 3, and then establish a connection between standalone and in-network privacy of modules in Section 4. We present our approximation results for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality and set constraints in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. In Section 6, we also present approximation results for the SECURE VIEW problem with bounded data sharing.
Module Privacy in a Workflow
In this section we formalize the notion of module privacy in a workflow, which we call in-network module privacy. We start with the simpler notion of standalone module privacy, which defines the privacy of a module when it appears alone (and not as part of a workflow). We also introduce the notion of hiding input and output data of a module in order to guarantee its privacy. We will assume throughout that all modules in a workflow are initially private, i.e. the user has no apriori knowledge about the functionality of any module prior to the workflow executions.
We start with some terminology that is used throughout the paper. An index k is a positive integer, and an index set I is a set of indices. Each data (initial, intermediate and final) in a workflow is assumed to have a unique index. Conversely, each index has a domain associated with it, namely the domain of the data it is associated with. We denote the domain of index k by D k . A data vector x is said to be defined on an index set I, denoted by x ∈ ∏ k∈I D k , if x contains |I| strings, each of which is associated with a unique index k ∈ I and belongs to D k . Then, x[k] denotes the string in x mapped to index k. For a data vector x ∈ ∏ k∈I D k , and for any subset of indices
Finally, for any J ⊆ I, the J-partition of I is a partition of all data vectors in ∏ k∈I D k such that two data vectors x, y ∈ ∏ k∈I D k are in the same subset of the partition iff x| J = y| J . 1 An algorithm is said to be a µ(n)-approximation algorithm for some non-decreasing function µ(n) : N + → N if on every input of size n it computes a solution where the value is within a factor of µ(n) of the optimal algorithm. 2 A problem is said to be APX-hard if there exists an ε 0 > 0 such that a (1 + ε 0 )-approximation in poly-time would imply P = NP.
Standalone Privacy of a Module
A standalone module v with input index set P and output index set Q computes a function f :
As a running example throughout this section, we use the following function, where each data is a single bit.
Example 1.
Let v be a module with input bits x 1 , x 2 and output bits x 3 , x 4 , x 5 . Suppose v computes function f : {0, 1} 2 → {0, 1} 3 where
The truth table of function f is given in Table 1 . Let P = {1, 2} and Q = {3, 4, 5} be the input and output index sets of v in this example. Our goal is to ensure that for any input x ∈ ∏ p∈P D p to v, a user is not be able to guess the value of f (x) with probability more than ε, for a given parameter ε > 0. To enforce privacy of module v, we will hide a set of input and output data for each execution of the module; the remaining data will be visible. The input and output index sets corresponding to the hidden data are called hidden input and output index sets, and denoted by P h and Q h respectively. Correspondingly, the visible input and output index sets are P v = P \ P h and Q v = Q \ Q h . On fixing a particular data set x v ∈ ∏ p∈P v D p as the visible part of the input data, the user sees an arbitrary data vector from the set { f (x)| Q v : x v = x| P v } as the visible output. For instance, in Example 1, if P v = {1} and Q v = {3, 5}, and if the user sets x v to 0, then she sees an arbitrary string in set {(0, 1), (1, 0)}, i.e. the visible output bits corresponding to an arbitrary row of Table 1 containing x 1 = 0. We allow the user to query the module an unbounded number of times on all settings of the visible input data. The observed relation for function f with respect to the hidden index sets P h and Q h is then defined as the set of all data that the user might see in an execution, i.e.
Note that there may be multiple functions g (besides f ) that would result in the same observed relation. For instance, in Example 1, we can partition the output rows into those corresponding to x 1 = 0 and x 1 = 1, and then permute the output rows inside each subset of the partition arbitrarily (keeping the input rows fixed), to obtain another function with the same observed relation. Such functions are called consistent functions.
is said to be consistent with module v with respect to hidden index sets
P h , Q h if R g,P h ,Q h = R f ,P h ,Q h .
The set of all consistent functions for v with respect to P h , Q h is denoted by F v,P h ,Q h .
We are now ready to define standalone privacy of a module. Recall that intuitively, a function is ε-private if for any input x, the user cannot guess the output with probability > ε. Given an input x, the output can be g(x) for any consistent function g; hence the size of the set of images of x under all consistent functions is a measure of the confidence of a user in deciding the output corresponding to x. 3 
Definition 2. Given a parameter ε > 0 and hidden input and output index sets P h and Q h , a module v is said to be
In general, more than one pair of index sets (P h , Q h ) can guarantee ε-privacy of a module. The privacy requirement (called a requirement list) can therefore be defined as a list of index sets (called set constraints) sufficient for guaranteeing privacy.
Definition 3. A module v is said to be
Hiding any one input and one output bit, or two output bits, yields
One shortcoming of the above representation is that the requirement list could be exponential in the number of input and output data. However, for many functions, the privacy requirement can be succinctly represented by a list of pairs of numbers (called cardinality constraints), where the module is ε-private if the number of hidden input and output data are at least the numbers specified by a pair. For instance, in Example 1, v is 1 4 -private if at least 2 output bits or 1 input and 1 output bit are hidden. Thus, a possible requirement list for 1 4 -privacy is {(1, 1), (0, 2)}. On the other hand, since hiding both input bits is not sufficient, (2, 0) cannot be part of any such list. Formally, we define L, ε CARD -privacy for a standalone module as follows:
Clearly, L, ε CARD -privacy is a special case of L, ε SET -privacy, and therefore might impose stricter privacy requirements on the module. However, the trade-off is that the size of a non-redundant list 5 in this formulation is at most the number of input or output data of the module.
Workflows: Networks of Modules
A workflow, also called a network of modules, is modeled by a directed acyclic multi-graph (DAG) G(V ∪ {s,t}, E) with a single source node s and a single sink node t. The vertex set V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } represents the n modules of the workflow, computing functions f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n respectively. The source node s acts as the distributor of the initial input data to different modules in the workflow, and the sink node t aggregates all the final output data. A module v i takes as input the output data produced by one or more v j , or the initial input data distributed by s, and sends its output data to the inputs of other v k and/or to the sink node t (see Figure 1) .
The set of all data in the network, denoted by B, comprises the input data to the network (i.e. output data from s) and all the output data from v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . As mentioned previously, we assign a unique index to each data in B. Each module v i has a fixed subset of indices P i ⊆ B as input and a fixed subset of indices Q i ⊆ B as output; these are called its input and output index sets. Hence for each module v i , f i :
The output index set of s and the input index set of t are denoted by Q s and P t respectively-they represent the initial input and the final output data of the workflow. The intermediate data B \ (Q s ∪ P t ) is denoted by B int . For example, in the workflow given in Figure 1 , 
For any set of candidate functions g = g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n for the modules v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n , we extend the notion of a run ρ of G to ρ g , by requiring that in Definition 5,
In-Network Privacy of a Module
Recall that the initial input and final output data of the workflow (corresponding to the index set Q s ∪ P t ) cannot be hidden. For each data b in the hidden index set B h ⊆ B int , the value of ρ(b) is not revealed for any run ρ. Given a network G, a hidden index set B h , and a sequence of candidate functions g = g 1 , . . . , g n for the modules v 1 , . . . , v n , the observed relation for g with respect to B h is defined as For example, suppose bit d 4 is hidden in the workflow depicted in Figure 1 . Consider functions
Definition 6. Let G be a workflow where module v i computes function f
It can be verified that the visible bits produced by these functions are exactly identical to those produced by f 1 , f 2 , f 3 , in any execution of the workflow. Therefore, g = g 1 , g 2 , g 3 is a consistent sequence of functions for the workflow, with respect to the hidden bit d 4 .
Finally, we define ε-privacy of a workflow. The underlying intuition is the same as in the standalone case, namely for any input to any module in the workflow, the user should not be able to guess the correct output of the module with probability > ε. 
The SECURE VIEW Problem
Having given a formal definition of module privacy, we now define the SECURE VIEW problem as that of minimizing the total cost of hidden data while guaranteeing the required in-network privacy of the modules.
Formally, an instance of the SECURE VIEW problem comprises a network of modules represented by a singlesource, single-sink directed acyclic multi-graph G = (V ∪ {s,t}, E), where V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } is the set of modules, and s and t are respectively the source and sink nodes. We are also given a set of data items B and a mapping φ : E → B that indicates the data (or equivalently, index) corresponding to an edge. The set of all intermediate data is denoted by B int . Only intermediate data b ∈ B int can be hidden, and c b is the cost of hiding data b. Cost of hiding data is assumed to be additive, i.e. the cost of hiding a set of data B h ⊆ B int is c(B h ) = ∑ b∈B h c b . Then given a parameter ε > 0, and the goal is to find a minimum cost subset B h such that G is B h , ε -private.
To make the problem tractable, the privacy requirement of the workflow is specified in terms of a requirement list L i for each module v i ∈ V . Depending on the composition of the requirement lists, there are two variants of the problem. In the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints, for each 
Note that the requirement lists specify local conditions for ensuring privacy of standalone modules, whereas a feasible solution requires global guarantees on their in-network privacy in the workflow. In the next section, we show that satisfying the local conditions specified by the requirement list of a module not only guarantees its standalone privacy, but also its in-network privacy in any workflow. This equivalence of standalone and in-network privacy guarantees is somewhat surprising, because privacy properties of standalone modules are expected to weaken when placed in a workflow due to mutual interaction. This connection simplifies the definition of the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints (resp., cardinality constraints). Now, a feasible solution is a data set B h ⊆ B int such that for each
Relationship between Standalone and In-network Module Privacy
We now show that if a pair of hidden input and output data vectors guarantee ε-privacy for a standalone module, they also guarantee ε-privacy for the module in any workflow, irrespective of its network topology.
We will assume throughout that the modules V = {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } are indexed in a topologically sorted order, and that P i and Q i denote the input and output index set of module v i respectively. 
Theorem 1.
It is tempting to try to show that any choice of a consistent function for a standalone module with respect to a particular pair of hidden input and output data vectors remains consistent for the module even when it is placed in a workflow, provided the same data vectors are hidden in the workflow. The above theorem would then follow immediately. However, it turns out that this is not true. In fact, the example below shows that the number of consistent functions for a module might decrease doubly exponentially (in the number of inputs) when the module is placed in a workflow.
Example 2.
In this example, each data is a single bit. Let v be a module with k input and k output bits such that the underlying function reverses the input bits, i.e. f (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) = (x k , x k−1 , . . . , x 1 ). Let G be a workflow that comprises two copies of v (call them v 1 and v 2 ) joined in series. Thus G computes the identity map.
Note that, ε-privacy of v can be ensured by hiding any ℓ = ⌈log( 
The number of consistent functions for module v therefore decreases by a factor of
2 . Theorem 1 shows that even though the number of consistent functions of a module can decrease substantially when the module is placed in a workflow as shown above, the privacy guarantees remain unchanged. In proving Theorem 1, our main technical result is Lemma 1, which states that given a set of hidden input and output data of a module, the set of possible outputs for a particular input to the module remains unchanged when the module is placed in a workflow, provided the same data are also hidden in the workflow. We continue to use P h i , Q h i to denote the indices of the hidden input and output data to v i , and,
to denote the corresponding visible indices.
Lemma 1. Consider any module v i . Let X and Y be subsets of the P v i -partition of ∏ k∈P i D k and the Q v i -partition of ∏ k∈Q i D k , and let x and y be any two data vectors in X and Y respectively. If there exists a w ∈ X such that z = f i (w) ∈ Y , then there exists a sequence of functions g = g j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n with g i (x) = y that is consistent for network G with respect to any set of hidden indices B h
First we show how this lemma implies Theorem 1. Let x ∈ X and y ∈ Y be two data vectors, where X and Y are subsets as defined in the lemma. There exists a consistent function g with y = g(x) for v i as a standalone module iff (x|
is an observed input-output pair. Then, there must exist w ∈ X, z ∈ Y (i.e. ) such that f i (w) = z. The lemma claims that in this case, there exists a consistent sequence of functions g = g j : 1 ≤ j ≤ n for workflow G with g i (x) = y, provided P h i and Q h i are also hidden in the workflow. Thus, the number of images, under consistent functions, of any input to v i does not decrease when v i is placed in a workflow, and Theorem 1 follows.
Before giving a formal proof of the lemma, we will give some intuition about our proof strategy. Consider a simple special case, where all the modules are connected in a chain. Assume that only output data of any module v i are hidden, i.e.
Note that for g to be a consistent sequence of functions for the workflow, the visible data values in any execution must remain identical to that for the actual sequence of functions f = f 1 , f 2 , . . . , f n . However, the values of the hidden data might be different for an execution of the workflow with module functions g and f. As a first try, let g be exactly identical to f, except that g i (x) = y instead of z. Since y, z ∈ Y , they have exactly the same visible data values. Thus, g does not violate consistency in the output data of v i . However, suppose that the visible parts of f i+1 (y) and f i+1 (z) do not match. Then, g violates the consistency requirement at the output of v i+1 for an execution with x as the input to v i . To avoid this, we modify g i+1 (which is simply f i+1 at this point) by adding a filter σ 1 at the input of v i+1 . σ 1 is an identity map except that σ 1 (y) = z. Thus, the new g i+1 is the composition of σ 1 with f i+1 , i.e. σ 1 · f i+1 . The previous violation is successfully avoided, but this modification creates a different consistency violation. Consider an execution where the input to v i is some x ′ such that f i (x ′ ) = y. For this execution, the output of v i was originally f i+1 (y), but is now g i+1 (y) = f i+1 (z). These two data vectors differ in their visible parts, and therefore g violates the consistency property. To fix this, we add a filter σ 2 at the output of v i . σ 2 is an identity map except that σ 2 (y) = z and σ 2 (z) = y. Then, the new g i is f i · σ 2 . Correspondingly, we replace the filter σ 1 at the input of v i+1 by a copy of σ 2 . Then, the new definition of g i+1 is σ 2 · f i+1 . It can be verified that g is now a consistent sequence of functions.
However, the general case introduces additional complications. First, input data of v i might be hidden requiring us to add filters at the input of v i . Further, due to data sharing, some of the hidden input data of v i might also act as input to other modules-we need to add filters to the inputs of those modules as well. Finally, only a part of the output of a module v i may act as input to another module v j . In this case, v j cannot distinguish between two different executions where the output of module v i are distinct data vectors y and y ′ respectively, if y and y ′ are identical when restricted to the input index set of v j . To handle this situation, we will make our filters more fine-grained, as shown below.
To formally prove the lemma, we introduce some additional notation to capture the notion of input and output filters that we described above. Let x ∈ ∏ i∈I D i and a, b ∈ ∏ j∈J D j for two index sets I and J. Then, y = FLIP a,b (w) ∈ ∏ i∈I D i is defined as
Note that FLIP a,b (FLIP a,b (x)) = x. In the proof of the lemma, we will also use the notion of function flipping, which is defined as follows.
Definition 8. Consider a function f
First, we claim that g i maps x to y as desired. This holds since
To prove the consistency of g = g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g n for G w.r.t. any set of hidden data B h ⊇ P h i ∪ Q h i , we need to show that for any run ρ, the visible data are identical for ρ f and ρ g . We prove by induction on j the visible output data of every module v j are identical in the two runs.
Let c j, f , c j,g be the input data and d j, f , d j,g the output data of module v j for ρ f and ρ g respectively, where the initial input data is the same for both runs. Then, we prove that d j,g = FLIP a,b (d j, f ). Since x, w ∈ X, they differ only in the indices corresponding to hidden data; similarly, for y, z ∈ Y . Therefore the data vectors a and b only differ in hidden indices. Then if the above claim is true, for every j, d j,g and d j, f are the same on the visible indices, and therefore the visible data for both runs are the same.
Note that if the inductive hypothesis holds for all j ′ < j, then c j,g = FLIP a,b (c j, f ), since the modules are listed in a topological order. Thus,
The SECURE VIEW Problem with Cardinality Constraints
In this section, we give an O(log n)-approximation algorithm for the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints. In addition, we show (in the appendix) that this problem is Ω(log n)-hard under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, even if the cost of hiding each data is identical and the requirement list of every module in the workflow contains exactly one pair of numbers.
Minimize ∑ b∈B int c b x b subject to In this IP, x b = 1 if data b is hidden, and r i j = 1 if at least α i j input data and β i j output data of module v i are hidden. Then, y bi j = 1 (resp., z bi j = 1) if both r i j = 1 and x b = 1, i.e. if data b contributes to satisfying the input requirement α i j (resp., output requirement β i j ) of module v i . Let us first verify that the IP indeed solves the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints. For each module v i , constraint (1) ensures that for some 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ i , r i j = 1. In conjunction with constraints (2) and (3), this ensures that for some 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ i , (i) at least α i j input data of v i have y bi j = 1 and (ii) at least β i j output data of v i have z bi j = 1. But, constraint (4) (resp., constraint (5)) requires that whenever y bi j = 1 (resp., z bi j = 1), data b be hidden, i.e. x b = 1, and a cost of c b be added to the objective. Thus the set of hidden data satisfy the privacy requirement of each module v i and the value of the objective is the cost of the hidden data. Note that constraints (6) and (7) are also satisfied since y bi j and z bi j are 0 whenever r i j = 0. Thus, the IP represents the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints.
One can write a simpler IP for this problem, where the summations are removed from constraints (4) and (5), and constraints (6) and (7) are removed altogether. To see the necessity of these constraints, consider the LP relaxation of the IP, obtained by replacing constraint (8) with x b , r i j , y bi j , z bi j ∈ [0, 1] .
Suppose constraints (6) and (7) were missing from the IP, and therefore from the LP as well. For a particular 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is possible that a fractional solution to the LP has r i j = 1/2 for two distinct values j 1 and j 2 of j, where α i j 1 > α i j 2 and β i j 1 < β i j 2 . But constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can now be satisfied by setting y bi j 1 = y bi j 2 = 1 (resp., z bi j 1 = z bi j 2 = 1) for α i j 1 /2 input data (resp., β i j 2 /2 output data). However, (α i j 1 /2, β i j 2 /2) might not satisfy the privacy requirement for i, forcing an integral solution to hide some data b with x b = 0. This will lead to an unbounded integrality gap. Now, suppose constraints (2) and (3) did not have the summation. For a particular 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it is possible that a fractional solution to the LP has r i j = 1/ℓ i for all 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ i . Constraint (2) (resp., constraint (3)) can then be satisfied by setting y bi j = 1/ℓ i for all 1 ≤ ℓ i , for max j {α i j } distinct input data (resp., max j {β i j } distinct output data). Correspondingly, x b = 1/ℓ i for those data b. If all the α i j s and β i j s for different 1 ≤ j ≤ ℓ i have similar values, it would mean that we are satisfying the privacy constraint for v i paying an ℓ i fraction of the cost of an integral solution. This can be formalized to yield an integrality gap of max i {ℓ i }, which could be n. Introducing the summation in the LP precludes this possibility.
We round the fractional solution to the LP relaxation using Algorithm 5. 
Analysis.
We can assume wlog that the requirement list L i for each v i ∈ V is non-redundant, i.e. for all 1 ≤ j 1 = j 2 ≤ ℓ i , either α i j 1 > α i j 2 and β i j 2 < β i j 1 , or α i j 1 < α i j 2 and β i j 2 > β i j 1 . We can thus assume that for each module v i , the list L i is sorted in increasing order on the values of α i j and in decreasing order on the values of β i j . The following lemma shows that step 2 satisfies the privacy requirement of each module with high probability We will show that after step 2, at least α im input data and β im output data is hidden with probability at least 1 − 2/n 2 for module v i .
We 
From constraint (4), we have
Then, from Eqn. (9),
Finally, using constraint (1), we conclude that
Similarly, since ∑ m j=1 r i j ≥ 1/2 and the list L i is sorted in decreasing order of β i j , it follows that
Next we show that |P round
with probability ≥ 1 − 1/n 2 . Each b ∈ B prob is independently included in B round with probability 16x b log n. Hence, by Eqn. (10),
Using Chernoff bound 6 , |B round ∩ P int i | ≤ α im − α det i with probability at most 1/n 2 . Similarly, using Eqn. (11),
with probability at most 1/n 2 . The lemma follows by using union bound over the failure probabilities.
Using Lemma 2, we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 5 gives a feasible solution with expected cost O(log n) times the optimal.
Proof. Using union bound over the set of modules in the above lemma, we conclude that with probability at least 1 − 2/n, the solution produced by the rounding algorithm after step 2 is feasible. By linearity of expectation, the cost of the rounded solution at this stage is at most 16 logn times that of the LP solution, and therefore O(log n) times that of the optimal cost. If all modules are not satisfied after step 3, the cost of the data added to B h in step 3 is at most O(n) times the optimal. However, this happens with probability at most 2/n; thus the expected total cost of the solution produced by this algorithm remains O(log n) times the optimal cost.
The SECURE VIEW Problem with Set Constraints
We now consider the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints. Let ℓ max be the maximum size of the requirement list of a module. We show the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
Unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n polylog n ), the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints cannot be approximated to within a factor of ℓ ε max for some ε > 0. The hardness result holds even when ℓ max is a (sufficiently large) constant, and each data has unit cost. Further, it is possible to get a factor ℓ max -approximation in polynomial time.
We give an ℓ max -approximation algorithm for this problem in the appendix. The hardness result in Theorem 3 is obtained by a reduction from the minimum label cover problem [5] . An instance of the minimum label cover problem consists of a bipartite graph H = (U,W, E H ), a label set L, and a non-empty relation R uw ⊆ L × L for each edge (u, w) ∈ E H . A feasible solution is a label assignment to the vertices, A : U ∪V → 2 L , such that for each edge (u, w), there exist ℓ 1 ∈ A(u), ℓ 2 ∈ A(w) such that (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) ∈ R uw . The objective is to find a feasible solution that minimizes ∑ u∈U∪W |A(u)|.
Unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n polylog n ), the label cover problem is |L| ε -hard to approximate for some constant ε > 0 [5, 27] . The instance of the SECURE VIEW problem in the reduction has ℓ max = |L| 2 . Theorem 3 follows immediately.
Given an instance of the label cover problem as defined above, we create an instance G = (V ∪ {s,t}, E) of the SECURE VIEW problem (refer to Figure 3 ). For each edge (u, w) ∈ E H , there is a module x uw ∈ V . In addition, V has another module z. As shown in Figure 3 , there are three kinds of edges in V : (i) a single edge e z from the source node s to z, (ii) a set of |2L| parallel edges e uw,u,ℓ from z to each x uw indexed by one of u or w and a label ℓ ∈ L, and (iii) a single e uw edge from each x uw to the sink node t. Edge e z and e uw , for each (u, w) ∈ E, uniquely carry data b z and b uw respectively, whereas data b u,ℓ is carried by all edges e uw,u,ℓ . Note that b u,ℓ are the only intermediate data in the workflow; the cost of hiding each such data is 1. The requirement list of z contains singleton subsets of 
The following lemma proves the correctness of the reduction.
Lemma 3. The label cover instance H has a solution of cost k iff the SECURE VIEW instance G has a solution of cost k.
Proof. Let A : U ∪W → 2 L be a solution of the label cover instance H with total cost k = ∑ u∈U∪W |A(u)|. We create a solution B h for the SECURE VIEW instance G as follows: for each u ∈ U ∪W , and ℓ ∈ L, add b u,ℓ to B h iff ℓ ∈ A(u). We claim that B h is a feasible solution for G. For each u ∈ U ∪W , A(u) is non-empty; hence, the requirement of z is trivially satisfied. Since A is a valid label cover solution, for each (u, w) ∈ E H , there exists ℓ 1 ∈ A(u) and ℓ 2 ∈ A(w) such that (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) ∈ R uw . Hence for the same pair 
For each x uw ∈ V , the requirement of x uw is satisfied by B h ; hence there exist ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ∈ L such that b u,ℓ 1 , b w,ℓ 2 ∈ B h . This implies that for each edge (u, w) ∈ E H , there exist ℓ 1 ∈ A(u) and ℓ 2 ∈ A(w), where (ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 ) ∈ R uw , thereby proving feasibility.
Remark. If N = |U| + |W |, the label cover problem is also known to be Ω(2 log 1−γ N )-hard to approximate for all constant γ > 0, unless NP ⊆ DTIME(n polylog n ) [5, 27] . Thus, the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints is Ω(2 log 1−γ n )-hard to approximate as well, for all constant γ > 0, under the same complexity assumption.
The SECURE VIEW Problem with Bounded Data Sharing
The SECURE VIEW problem becomes substantially easier to approximate if the workflow has bounded data sharing, i.e. when every data d produced by some module is either a final output data or is an input data to at most γ other modules. Though the problem remains NP-hard even with this restriction, the following theorem shows that it is possible to approximate it within a constant factor when γ is a constant.
Theorem 4.
There is a (γ + 1)-approximation algorithm for both versions of the SECURE VIEW problem when each data acts as input to at most γ modules. On the other hand, both versions of the problem remain APX-hard even when there is no data sharing (i.e. γ = 1), each data has unit cost, and ℓ max is 2.
First, we give a (γ + 1)-approximation algorithm for the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints, where each data is shared by at most γ edges. This also implies an identical approximation factor for the cardinality version. Then, we show that the cardinality version of the problem is APX-hard, i.e. there exists a constant c > 1 such that it is NP-hard to obtain a c-approximate solution to the problem. The set version is therefore APX-hard as well.
(γ + 1)-Approximation Algorithm
Recall that the input to the problem includes a requirement list
The algorithm greedily satisfies the (P i j * , Q i j * ) requirement for each module v i , i.e. the set of hidden data B h = 1≤i≤n (P i j * ∪ Q i j * ).
Note that each intermediate data is an input to at most γ modules. In any optimal solution, assume that each terminal module of every hidden edge carrying this data pays its cost. Then, the total cost paid by the modules is at most γ + 1 times the cost of the optimal solution. On the other hand, the total cost paid by any module is at least the cost of the edges incident on the module that are hidden by the algorithm. Thus, the solution of the algorithm has cost at most γ + 1 times the optimal cost.
A very similar greedy algorithm with the same approximation factor can be given to the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints.
APX-Hardness
We give a reduction from the minimum vertex cover problem in cubic graphs to the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints. An instance of the vertex cover problem consists of an undirected graph G ′ (V ′ , E ′ ). The goal is to find a subset of vertices S ⊆ V ′ of minimum size |S| such that each edge e ∈ E ′ has at least one endpoint in S.
Given an instance of the vertex cover problem, we create an instance of the SECURE VIEW problem G(V ∪{s,t}, E) (see Figure 4) . For each edge (u, v) ∈ E ′ , there is a module x uv in V ; also there is a module y v for each vertex v ∈ V ′ . In addition to these, V contains a single module z. For each x uv , the edge set E includes an edge (s, x uv ) and edges (x uv , y u ) and (x uv , y v ). There is an edge (y v , z) in E for every y v ∈ V . Finally, there is an edge (z,t) in E.
There is no data sharing in the workflow, and hiding a data is equivalent to hiding the edge carrying it. So, we do not introduce an explicit data set, and consider hiding edges instead of data. Note that only edges of the form (x uv , y u ) can be hidden, since they are the only ones carrying intermediate data; the cost of hiding each such edge is 1.
Finally, we define the requirement list for each module in V . For each x uv , L uv = {(0, 1)}, i.e. the requirement for x uv is any single outgoing edge. , z) to B h . Further, for each x uv , if u / ∈ S, add (x uv , y u ) to B h , otherwise add (x uv , y v ). We claim that B h is a feasible solution for G. Clearly, the requirement is satified for each x uv , since one outgoing edge is hidden; the same holds for all y v such that v ∈ S. Assuming E ′ to be non-empty, any vertex cover is of size at least one. Hence at least one incoming edge to z is hidden. Finally, for every y v such that v / ∈ S, all its incoming edges are hidden; if not, S is not a vertex cover. Hence B h satisfies the requirement of all vertices in V . Since we hide exactly one outgoing edge from all x uv , and exactly one outgoing edge from all y v where v ∈ S, the cost of the solution is m ′ + k. Now assume that we have a solution B h ⊆ B of the SECURE VIEW instance with cost |B h | = k ′ . We can assume, wlog, that for each x uv exactly one outgoing edge is included in B h ; if both (x uv , y u ) and (x uv , y v ) are in B h , we arbitrarily select one of u or v, say u, and replace the edge (x uv , y u ) in B h with the edge (y u ,t) to get another feasible solution without increasing the cost. We claim that the set S ⊆ V ′ of vertices v such that (y v , z) ∈ B h forms a vertex cover. For any edge (u, v) ∈ E ′ , if (x uv , y u ) / ∈ B h , then (y u , z) ∈ B h to satisfy the requirement of y u , and therefore u ∈ S; otherwise, v ∈ S by the same argument. Hence S is a vertex cover. Since each vertex x uv has exactly one outgoing edge in B h , |S| = k ′ − m ′ .
To complete the proof, note that if G ′ were a cubic graph, i.e. the degree of each vertex is at most 3, then the size of any vertex cover k ≥ m ′ /3. It is known that vertex cover in cubic graphs is APX-hard [4] ; hence so is the SECURE VIEW problem with cardinality constraints and no data sharing. An exactly identical reduction shows that the SECURE VIEW problem with set constraints and no data sharing is APX-hard as well.
Conclusions
We developed a model of privacy for module functionality in workflows where data are made public over repeated workflow executions. Our model motivates a natural optimization problem, the SECURE VIEW problem, which seeks to identify the smallest amount of intermediate data that needs to be hidden so that the functionality of every module is kept private. We developed algorithms and hardness results that characterize the complexity of the SECURE VIEW problem.
Our work suggests several promising directions for future exploration. One natural direction is to understand the connection between the network topology and the tractability of the SECURE VIEW problem. In the presence of unrestricted data sharing, our hardness results hold even for very simple network topologies (special cases of series-parallel graphs). However, when there is no data sharing, our initial work suggests that the problem becomes poly-time solvable for some interesting and natural classes of graphs (e.g., series-parallel graphs). A more ambitious future direction is to develop models of privacy when some of the modules in the workflow are public, that is, the underlying code is publicly available. In the absence of any restriction on the behavior of public modules, it is not difficult to construct workflows where the presence of such modules provably compromises privacy of proprietary modules. Thus handling privacy in this more general setting requires identifying natural restrictions on the behavior of public modules.
